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“MR. BAD EXAMPLE”: WHY LAWYERS
NEED TO EMBRACE THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE TO ROOT OUT SANISM
IN THE REPRESENTATION OF PERSONS
WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES
Michael L. Perlin, Esq.* and Alison J. Lynch, Esq.†
I. Introduction
As co-authors, our experiences practicing law across several states have
informed our approach to the issue of persuasion in ways that teaching and
creating scholarship on these questions alone could not. They form the bases
of the thesis that we put forth in this article: The representation of persons with
mental disabilities is infected—often, fatally infected—by sanism.1 Sanism leads
to paralytic rolelessness on the part of many persons who represent this population,

* Professor Emeritus of Law; Founding Director International Mental Disability Law
Reform Project, New York Law School; Co-founder, Mental Disability Law and Policy Associates.
Before becoming a professor, I spent thirteen years as a lawyer representing persons with mental
disabilities, including three years in which I focused primarily on such individuals charged with
crime. In my role as Deputy Public Defender in Mercer County, New Jersey, I represented several
hundred individuals at what was then (offensively) characterized as the “maximum security hospital
for the criminally insane,” both in individual cases and in class actions. For more information, see
Dixon v. Cahill, No. L30977/y-71 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973), reprinted in Michael L.
Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo, Mental Disability Law: Civil and Criminal § 19-8 (3d ed.
2016). I continued to represent this population for a decade as Director of the New Jersey Division
of Mental Health Advocacy and Special Counsel to the New Jersey Public Advocate. In those roles, I
supervised thousands of individuals’ civil commitment and periodic review hearings, and litigated a
range of class action law reform cases. I also second sat the case of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984), which established a constitutional effectiveness of counsel standard in criminal cases.
† Staff Attorney, Disability Rights New York; Instructor, Mental Disability Law and Policy
Associates. I have worked on individual cases and systemic litigation for cases involving individuals
with mental illness, either in the community or in psychiatric facilities around New York State.
1

See infra notes 42–102 and accompanying text.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2016

1

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 16 [2016], No. 2, Art. 3

300

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 16

makes negative case outcomes nearly inevitable, and is the cause of much of
the frustration that befalls those who try to provide adequate representation
in these cases.2 One solution—perhaps the only meaningful solution—is the
consideration of and the adoption of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) principles
by counsel representing such clients. These precepts offer a radically different
perspective on the provision of counsel—whether the case is a civil commitment
case, institutional reform case, criminal case, or civil case that, on its surface,
appears to have nothing to do with “mental disability law.” TJ is, and can be, a
way to implement positive psychology through the litigation relationship and
can be a critically important tool of persuasion in all aspects of the lawyer-client
relationship, case negotiations, and the courtroom process. TJ provides a readymade toolkit for lawyers representing this population, as it allows and encourages
them to focus on the critical concepts of voluntariness, voice, and validation, and
is buttressed by what has been referred to in other contexts as the “ethic of care.”3
A TJ approach fits perfectly within the framework of the broader concept of the
“psychology of persuasion.”4
In this article, we draw on our experiences and observations as practitioners
and scholars, and consider how the TJ toolkit can enhance the representation
of persons with mental disabilities in all aspects of the legal system. We hope
that readers will see that TJ is the perfect means for optimizing the psychology
of persuasion in such representation. First, we will discuss the lawyer’s role and
the conflicts that inevitably arise when lawyers represent persons with mental
disabilities.5 Second, we will discuss the meaning of sanism, and how sanism
dominates the entire representational process in such cases.6 Third, we will
discuss how the conflicts and the poison of sanism taint the lawyer-client
relationship.7 We will subsequently discuss the meaning of TJ, and finally
synthesize the material within the context of the psychology of persuasion,
especially as it relates to the concept of validation.8
Our title comes, in part, from Warren Zevon’s song, “Mr. Bad Example.”
The song, a totally dysphoric life story of the narrator,9 includes this couplet: “Of
course I went to law school and took a law degree/ And counseled all my clients

2

See infra notes 42–102 and accompanying text.

3

See infra notes 109–10 and accompanying text.

4

See infra notes 118–27 and accompanying text.

5

See infra notes 16–41 and accompanying text.

6

See infra notes 42–52 and accompanying text.

7

See infra notes 53–102 and accompanying text.

8

See infra notes 103–27 and accompanying text.

See Warren Zevon, Mr. Bad Example (Warner Bros. Records 1991) (“I’m very well
acquainted with the seven deadly sins. I keep a busy schedule trying to fit them in. I’m proud to be
a glutton, and I don’t have time for sloth. I’m greedy, and I’m angry, and I don’t care who I cross.”).
9
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to plead insanity.”10 Although this is certainly poetic license, it has more than a
grain of truth—albeit, no doubt unconsciously on Zevon’s part.
An insanity plea is often a very bad option for a criminal defendant. For
example, Jones v. United States,11 one of the United States Supreme Court’s worst
decisions in mental disability law, involved an insanity plea for a defendant whose
underlying charge was attempted shoplifting.12 The plea was apparently entered
without the defendant being aware of the plea or its ramifications,13 leading to
long-term incarceration served in maximum security institutional confinement.14
Jones “illuminated the Court’s antipathy toward insanity pleaders”15 and resulted
in large part from the abjectly ineffective assistance of counsel provided by Jones’
trial lawyer. He was, indeed, a “bad example” for all of us, and we use Warren
Zevon’s lyrics as a reminder of what can happen if counsel does not take seriously
clients with mental disabilities.

II. Representation of Persons with Mental Disabilities16
If there is one characteristic that underscores the problems that are faced by
lawyers who represent persons with mental disabilities, it is “rolelessness.” One
of the co-authors (MLP) identified this problem over thirty years ago, and the
problem still persists today. In many jurisdictions, there has been little or no
improvement in the intervening years since he first stated that
[T]raditional, sporadically-appointed counsel in mental health
cases [were] unwilling to pursue necessary investigations,
lack[ed] . . . expertise in dealing with mental health problems,
and . . . suffered from “rolelessness,” stemming from near total
capitulation to experts, hazily defined concept[s] of success/
10

Id.

11

See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).

See id.; e.g., Michael L. Perlin, “Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail”: Using Therapeutic Jurisprudence
to Remediate the Criminalization of Persons with Mental Illness, 17 Mich. St. U. J. Med. & L. 343,
357–58 (2013) [hereinafter Wisdom Is Thrown Into Jail ]; Michael L. Perlin, “There’s No Success Like
Failure/and Failure’s No Success at All”: Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 1247, 1276 (1998) [hereinafter There’s No Success Like Failure ] (criticizing Jones as a
pretextual decision).
12

See generally Jones, 463 U.S. 354. The insanity defense was entered into pursuant to a
stipulation and at the initial retention hearing defense counsel presented no evidence. See id. at 360;
see also Wisdom Is Thrown Into Jail, supra note 12, at 357–58.
13

14
See, e.g., Wisdom Is Thrown Into Jail, supra note 12, at 357–58; There’s No Success Like
Failure, supra note 12, at 1276.

Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact of the ADA on the
Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 Ala. L. Rev. 193,
194 (2000).
15

16
This section is largely adapted from Michael L. Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo, Mental
Disability Law: Civil and Criminal §§ 6.2, 6.6.2 (3d ed. 2016).
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failure, inability to generate professional or personal interest in
[the] patient’s dilemma, and lack of [a] clear definition of [the]
proper advocacy function. As a result, counsel . . . functioned “as
no more than a clerk ratifying the events that transpire[d], rather
than influencing them.”17
Additionally, there was rarely any serious exploration of basic legal questions
dealing with the factual basis of a client’s dangerousness,18 the thoroughness
of the evaluating physician’s medical examination, or the existence of possible
available alternatives to inpatient hospitalization.19 Expert testimony was also
rarely challenged,20 and it seemed as though virtually all counsel took the position
that they had “no choice but to trust the psychiatrist.”21 As a result, commitment
hearings became “an empty ritual,”22 accomplishing no more than adding a
“falsely reassuring patina of respectability to the proceedings.”23

Michael L. Perlin & Robert L. Sadoff, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Individuals
in the Commitment Process, 45 Law & Contemp. Probs. 161, 164 (1982) (alterations in original)
(quoting Michael L. Perlin, Representing Individuals in the Commitment and Guardianship Process, in
1 Legal Rights of Mentally Disabled Persons 497, 501 (Paul Friedman ed., 1979) [hereinafter
Representing Individuals]). Accord Elliott Andalman & David Chambers, Effective Counsel for
Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, a Polemic, and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 43 (1974);
George E. Dix, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Wisconsin: A Need for Reexamination, 51
Marq. L. Rev. 1 (1967); David B. Wexler et al., The Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory
and Practice in Arizona, 13 Ariz. L. Rev. 1 (1971).
17

In virtually all jurisdictions, the current standard for involuntary civil commitment is
mental illness and, as a result of that mental illness, danger to one’s self or others. See, e.g., N.J. Ct.
R. 4:74-7(f ).
18

See Virginia Hiday, The Attorney’s Role in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 60 N.C. L. Rev.
1027, 1030 (1982) (citation omitted); see also Andalman & Chambers, supra note 17, at 43–44;
Wexler et al., supra note 17, at 52, 54.
19

See David R. Richardson & Robert B. Barbor, The Louisiana Mental Health Law of 1977:
An Analysis and a Critique, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 542, 566 (1978); Wexler et al., supra note 17, at 54 –55.
20

Fred Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44
Tex. L. Rev. 424, 450 (1966) (citation omitted); see also Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 17, at 165.
When one of the co-authors (MLP) was on the New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on
Civil Commitments, he had a conversation with then Chief Justice Richard J. Hughes and one
of the psychiatrists at the state hospital whom he regularly cross-examined at hearings involving
defendants at New Jersey’s maximum security forensic facility. The doctor told the Chief Justice,
“Mr. Perlin tortures me with this unnecessary cross-examination.” The Chief Justice asked, “Why
is it unnecessary?” The doctor responded, “I can look in their eyes and tell if they are crazy and
dangerous. That’s all the trial judge needs to know.”
21

22

Hiday, supra note 19, at 1030; see also Cohen, supra note 21, at 448.

23

Hiday, supra note 19, at 1030; see also Andalman & Chambers, supra note 17, at 72.
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Why do lawyers experience these role conflicts in representing individuals in
the civil commitment process?24 We can think of at least eight separate explana
tions. First, many lawyers assume that hospitalization is inevitably beneficial
for persons with mental disabilities and fail to take into account such factors
as iatrogenic illness,25 the conditions that are prevalent in many of the public
psychiatric facilities to which patients are regularly committed,26 and the severity
of the side effects often caused by the administration of psychotropic medication.27
Second, because the hospital is a closed system, hospital administrators almost
exclusively control systemic issues such as access to patients, times, locations, and
communications, creating a power imbalance.28 As a result, counsel may find it
virtually impossible to develop a lawyer-client relationship, to develop proofs, or
to discover witnesses.29
Third, although case law and statutes forbid a presumption of incompetency
because of a patient’s institutionalization, counsel’s perception of the patientclient’s credibility remains a major issue.30 It is axiomatic that an attorney’s doubt,
See Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 407, 425 (2000) [hereinafter
A Law of Healing] (“[T]he overwhelming number of cases involving mental disability law issues
are ‘litigated’ in pitch darkness. Involuntary civil commitment cases are routinely disposed of in
minutes behind closed courtroom doors.”).
24

25
Iatrogenic illness refers to an illness caused by a doctor or a hospital. See Barry R. Furrow,
The Problem of Medical Error: The Institution as Toxin, 9 Medico-Legal Watch 67 (Jan. 2000).
26
See David Kantor & Victor Gellinau, Making Chronic Schizophrenics, 53 Mental
Hygiene 54 (1969); Stanley F. Yolles, Mental Health’s Homeostatic State: A New Territory, 7 Int’l J.
Psychiatry 327, 328 (1969). See generally Ivan Illich, Limits to Medicine, Medical Nemesis: The
Expropriation of Health (1976).
27
See Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 16, § 8-2, at 8-15 to 8-16 (“As a result of the prevalence of
these side effects as well as a variety of other causes, patients and their counsel began to seek judicial
relief as a means of either terminating or altering unwanted medical treatment.” (citations omitted)).

On power imbalances in this context generally, see e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Power
Imbalances in Therapeutic and Forensic Relationships, 9 Behav. Sci. & L. 111 (1991); Janet B. Abisch,
Mediational Lawyering in the Civil Commitment Context: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Solution to
the Counsel Role Dilemma, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 120, 131 (1995).
28

29
There is an important analogy here that has never, to the best of our knowledge, been
discussed in literature. We know that there is a positive relationship between a criminal defendant
being bailed prior to trial and his subsequently being acquitted or receiving a non-custodial
sentence. See Michael L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, “You Might Have Drugs at Your Command”:
Reconsidering the Forced Drugging of Incompetent Pre-Trial Detainees From the Perspectives of
International Human Rights and Income Inequality, 8 Alb. Gov’t L. Rev. 381, 383 n.12 (2015)
(discussing State v. Johnson, 294 A.2d 245, 251 n.6 (N.J. 1972) (“[A]n accused who has been
detained in jail between his arraignment and the final adjudication of his case is more likely to
receive a criminal conviction or jail sentence than an accused who has been free on bail.”) and
Anne Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 641, 641–43, 655 (1964)
(showing a connection between continuous detention and unfavorable outcomes, such as
conviction)). Of course, all individuals facing civil commitment are institutionalized prior to their
commitment hearing.
30

See Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 16, §§ 6-6.2, at 6-84.
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whether or not explicitly articulated, about the client’s credibility may have a
devastating effect at trial,31 especially in cases such as involuntary commitments,
where a finding of mental illness is an element of proof.32
Fourth, the very nature of total institutionalization demands a special degree
of ingenuity and persistence on counsel’s part if he or she is to track down and
interview witnesses. Although an institutionalized patient may find it physically
impossible to produce coworkers, friends, neighbors, or character witnesses
to testify at a commitment hearing there may be other people available, such
as hospital staff members, outside therapists, or other patients, who could
provide favorable testimony on the patient’s behalf. If counsel is not sufficiently
persistent, these witnesses will remain unfound and representation of the client
may be incomplete.
Fifth, the attorney’s self-perceived “rolelessness” breeds serious confusion.
Notwithstanding case law,33 attorneys often view commitment proceedings as
non-adversarial and somehow different from other cases.34 Because the attorney
often cannot identify with the client, distance is created, further imperiling the
attorney-client relationship. Also, unlike a typical criminal trial, resulting in a
guilty or not guilty finding, or in a civil case, where a cause of action is found
either to exist or not to exist, a civil commitment hearing does not fit into a
discrete paradigm. Because the attorney may be incapable of perceiving whether
the case was a victory or a loss, the attorney’s ambivalence may increase.35
Sixth, attorneys who possess scant knowledge about psychiatric decisionmaking, diagnoses, and evaluation tools will be seriously impeded in their
cross-examination of expert witnesses and in their evaluation of expert testimony.

31
See, e.g., Hiday, supra note 19, at 1039 (a study showed only 2.3% of all appointed counsel
challenged a finding of mental illness).
32
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (establishing “clear and convincing evi
dence” as the minimum burden of proof at commitment hearings); see generally Robert Rubinson,
Constructions of Client Competence and Theories of Practice, 31 Ariz. St. L.J. 121 (1999). In all of
the eleven years that one of the co-authors (MLP) litigated and supervised commitment/retention
hearings, he never came in contact with a single state hospital doctor who paid the slightest bit of
attention to the New Jersey statute that specifically forbade that presumption.
33
See, e.g., Quesnell v. State, 517 P.2d 568, 575–76 (1973); State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy,
249 N.W.2d 573, 576 –77 (1977).

See Hiday, supra note 19, at 1036 (attorneys “agreed overwhelmingly with the statement,
‘Representing respondents in civil commitment cases should be different from representing other
kinds of clients since hospitalization may be in the best interest of the client.’”).
34

35
For an analysis of the United States Supreme Court’s ambivalence in this area, see
Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, and Symbolic
Values: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or Doctrinal Abyss?, 29 Ariz. L. Rev. 1 (1987); Michael
L. Perlin, “No Direction Home”: The Law and Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 20
Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 605 (1996).
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Although one study shows that, with respect to sporadically appointed counsel,
mere knowledge of psychiatric techniques may make virtually no difference
in a case’s outcome,36 such knowledge is an initial building block to effective
representation of counsel.37
Seventh, there are external constraints on counsel who represent individuals
at involuntary civil commitment hearings that are not faced by other attorneys.
For example, “tremendous pressures are often placed upon counsel by mental
health professionals, family members, and other members of the community to
allow the state to ‘help’ the mentally ill person by [acquiescing in the process of ]
institutionalization.”38 In over forty years that MLP has been a lawyer, these were
the only cases in which he received communications from family members of his
clients asking if he could find a way to lose their relatives’ cases.
Finally, attorneys often deal ineffectively with what they perceive as their
clients’ “differentness,”39 as they are not accustomed to developing relationships
with clients who may be passive, frightened, inarticulate, and unaware of their
possible options. Beyond this, because a patient’s demeanor may be considered
different, an attorney may feel foolish or awkward in representing a client’s views
because the attorney fears the judge might ascribe those views to the attorney.40

36
See Norman Poythress, Psychiatric Expertise in Civil Commitment: Training Attorneys to
Cope with Expert Testimony, 2 Law & Hum. Behav. 1 (1978) [hereinafter Psychiatric Expertise]; see
also Norman G. Poythress, Mental Health Expert Testimony: Current Problems, 5 J. Psychiatry & L.
201, 210–13 (1977).
37
In discussing his experiences training lawyers about mental illness, Dr. Norman Poythress
concluded that the “trained” lawyers’ behavior in court was not materially different from that of
“untrained” lawyers because the former group’s attitudes toward their clients had not changed.
He noted that mere knowledge of cross-examination methods “did not deter them from taking
[the] more traditional, passive, paternal stance towards the proposed patients.” Psychiatric Expertise,
supra note 36, at 15. As one trainee noted: “I really enjoyed your workshop, and I’ve been reading
over your materials and its [sic] all very interesting, but this is the real world, and we’ve got to do
something with these people. They’re sick.” Psychiatric Expertise, supra note 36, at 15.
38
Eric S. Engum & Daniel J. Cuneo, Attorney’s Role as Advocate in Civil Commitment
Hearings, 9 J. Psychiatry & L. 161, 162 (1981). The authors also note “lack of funds” and
“crushing caseloads” as two other “primary determinants” that “tend to shape the role of counsel in
commitment proceedings.” Id.

See Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism”, 46 SMU L. Rev. 373, 398 (1992) [hereinafter
On “Sanism” ] (“Legislators have traditionally responded to socially-expressed fears by enacting laws
that focus on the perceived differentness of people with mental disabilities in almost all aspects
of social intercourse.”). On the role of difference in this area in general, see Martha Minow,
Making all the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (1991).
39

40
This conflict becomes more significant in light of the court’s view of the entire process. See
Thomas K. Zander, Civil Commitment in Wisconsin: The Impact of Lessard v. Schmidt, 1976 Wis.
L. Rev. 503, 516 (1976) (80% of surveyed Wisconsin judges endorsed the “best interests” model
and 12% adopted the adversary position).
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This “differentness” may engender acute embarrassment that inevitably will
diminish the scope and quality of the attorney’s advocacy.41
It is this final piece of “rolelessness” that we must focus on more carefully. We
believe this attitude by counsel—feeling foolish or awkward presenting a client’s
view to the court and fearing the judge might ascribe the client’s characteristics
to the lawyer—are pure manifestations of what we call “sanism,” a factor that
poisons the lawyer-client relationship and the entire legal process.

III. Sanism 42
Sanism is an “irrational prejudice of the same quality and character as other
irrational prejudices that cause, and are reflected in, prevailing social attitudes
such as racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry . . . .”43 Sanism reflects
discrimination on the basis of one’s mental state or condition.44 Sanism—“the
pervasive stigma that befalls persons with mental disabilities”45—permeates the
legal process both in cases in which mental capacity is a central issue, and those in
which such capacity is a collateral question.46 It affects all participants in the mental
disability law system, including litigants, fact finders, counsel, and expert and lay
witnesses, and its corrosive effects have warped all aspects of mental disability law,
involuntary civil commitment law, anti-discrimination law institutional law, tort
law, and all aspects of the criminal process.47 Sanism also reflects what civil rights
lawyer Florynce Kennedy has characterized as the “pathology of oppression.”48
Attorneys, courts, legislatures, professional psychiatric and psychological
associations, and academic scholarship are all largely silent on the issue of sanism.

41

See Representing Individuals, supra note 17, at 505.

See generally Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: Sanism in Clinical
Teaching, 9 Clinical L. Rev. 683 (2003) [hereinafter Sanism in Clinical Teaching].
42

43
Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “All His Sexless Patients”: Persons with Mental Disabilities
and the Competence to Have Sex, 89 Wash. L. Rev. 257, 259 (2014). On the way that sanism affects
lawyers’ representation of clients, see Sanism in Clinical Teaching, supra note 42, at 689–90.

See Sanism in Clinical Teaching, supra note 42, at 718; see also Michael L. Perlin, The
Hidden Prejudice: Mental Disability on Trial (2000) [hereinafter The Hidden Prejudice].
44

45
Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights and Mental Disability Law: When
Silenced Are Heard (2011); see Michael L. Perlin, “Striking for the Guardians and Protectors
of the Mind”: The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Future of
Guardianship Law, 117 Penn St. L. Rev. 1159, 1161 (2013).

the

See Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and
Why and How Mental Disability Law Developed as It Did, 10 J. Contemp. L. Issues 3 (1999)
(discussing how sanism permeates all mental disability law).
46

47
See Michael L. Perlin, “I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your Funeral, My Trial”:
Global Clinical Legal Education and the Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment Cases, 28 Wash. U.
J.L. & Pol’y 241, 259 (2008).
48

Id. at 259.
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A handful of practitioners, lawmakers, scholars, and judges have raised lonely
voices, but the topic is simply “off the agenda” for most people.49 As a result,
individuals with mental disabilities—“the voiceless, those persons traditionally
isolated from the majoritarian democratic political system”50—are frequently
marginalized to an even greater extent than are others who are marginalized
by the courts and society in other ways.51 To illustrate, sanist lawyers distrust
their clients with mental disabilities, trivialize their clients’ complaints, fail to
forge authentic lawyer-client relationships with such clients, reject their clients’
potential contributions to case-strategizing, and take adverse case outcomes less
seriously.52 Each of these failures is addressed separately.

A. Distrust of the Client
One of the basic building blocks of mental disability law is the principle that
incompetence cannot be presumed either because of mental illness or because
of a past history of institutionalization.53 Furthermore, there is “no necessary
relationship between mental illness and incompetency which renders [mentally ill
persons] unable to provide informed consent to medical treatment.”54 As stated
forcefully by the New York Court of Appeals:
We conclude however, that neither the fact that appellants are
mentally ill nor that they have been involuntarily committed,
without more, constitutes a sufficient basis to conclude that they
lack the mental capacity to comprehend the consequences of
their decision to refuse medication that poses a significant risk
to their physical well-being.55
Additionally, publications by the MacArthur Foundation’s Network on Mental
Health and the Law dramatically conclude that mentally ill patients are not
always incompetent to make rational decisions and that they are not inherently

See Michael L. Perlin, “What’s Good Is Bad, What’s Bad Is Good, You’ll Find Out When
You Reach the Top, You’re On the Bottom”: Are the Americans with Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v.
L.C.) Anything More Than “Idiot Wind”?, 35 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 235, 236 (2002).
49

50

On “Sanism”, supra note 39, at 375 (citation omitted).

51

On “Sanism”, supra note 39, at 375 (citation omitted).

52

See Sanism in Clinical Teaching, supra note 42, at 695.

53

See, e.g., In re LaBelle, 728 P.2d 138, 146 (Wash. 1986) (en banc).

Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 935 (N.D. Ohio 1980); see also Bruce J. Winick,
Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 Hous. L. Rev.
15 (1991).
54

55

Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d. 337, 341–42 (N.Y. 1986).
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more incompetent than patients who are not mentally ill.56 In fact, “on any given
measure of decisional abilities, the majority of patients with schizophrenia did not
perform more poorly than other patients and nonpatients.”57
In short, the presumption in which courts have regularly engaged—that
there is both a de facto and de jure presumption of incompetency to be applied
to medical decision making—appears to be based on an empirical fallacy. Yet,
lawyers distrust their clients with mental disabilities, both in cases in which mental
disability is a central issue and in those in which mental disability is collateral.58
Lawyers assume, for example, that a criminal defendant with mental disabilities
is not competent to decide whether to plead insanity or to plead other factbased defenses. In more than one-third of insanity defense cases, “the attorneys
appear[ed] to have preempted their clients’ participation in the decision-making
process.”59 Such lawyers apply an equivalent assumption of incompetency when
representing civil clients with mental disabilities,60 and that assumption certainly
rears its head if the client is institutionalized. For instance, “ward psychiatrists
demonstrate a propensity to equate incompetent with makes bad decisions and to
assume, in face of statutory and case law, that incompetence in decision making
can be presumed from the fact of institutionalization.”61 Like mental health
professionals, these lawyers treat their clients as “patients that are sick.”62
Lawyers, of course, are not the only professionals who share these views. An
article published in a police management journal included a focus on how police
56
See Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence
Study III: Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 Law & Hum.
Behav. 149 (1995); see also Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Is It More Than “Dodging
Lions and Wastin’ Time”? Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the Judicial Process in
Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 114, 120 (1996).
57

Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 56, at 169.

For a full discussion, see Sanism in Clinical Teaching, supra note 42, at 695–00; see also,
e.g., Jeffrey Swanson et al., Justice Disparities: Does the ADA Enforcement System Treat People with
Psychiatric Disabilities Fairly?, 66 Md. L. Rev. 94, 135 (2006).
58

Richard Bonnie et al., Decision-Making in Criminal Defense: An Empirical Study of
Insanity Pleas and the Impact of Doubted Client Competence, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 48,
57 (1996). See, e.g., State v. Khan, 417 A.2d 585 (N.J. App. Div. 1980), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Handy, 73 A.3d 421 (N.J. 2013) (when the assigned trial lawyer heard Khan discuss
“crazy” ideas, he insisted that Khan plead insanity, notwithstanding Khan’s fact-based claim of selfdefense; MLP served as Khan’s lawyer on appeal).
59

See Michael L. Perlin, “I Ain’t Gonna Work on Maggie’s Farm No More”: Institutional
Segregation, Community Treatment, the ADA, and the Promise of Olmstead v. L.C., 17 T.M. Cooley
L. Rev. 53, 64 (2000) (“A series of behavioral myths has emerged suggesting that persons with
mental disabilities are deviant, worth less than ‘normal’ individuals, disproportionately dangerous,
and presumptively incompetent.”).
60

61

Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 56, at 121.

Bruce Arrigo, Punishing the Mentally Ill: A Critical Analysis of Law and Psychiatry
29–30 (2002).
62
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officers employ stereotypes in dealing with persons with mental disabilities in
almost the same way as lawyers.63 According to the article, “[o]fficers’ stereotypes
of mentally disturbed people included the idea that it is not possible to have a
meaningful conversation with such people,”64 and that “officers hold on to the
ideas that mentally disturbed people are completely irrational and cannot be
reasoned with.”65 The parallels to what we have discovered about lawyers in this
context are frightening.66
The attitudes displayed by such lawyers are also echoed in case law. On the
question of determining whether a witness is competent to testify, the influential
case of Sinclair v. Wainwright 67 states the controlling legal standards:
[I]f a patient in a mental institution is offered as a witness,
an opposing party may challenge competency, whereupon it
becomes the duty of the court to make such an examination as
will satisfy the court of the competency of the proposed witness.
And if the challenged testimony is crucial, critical or highly
significant, failure to conduct an appropriate competency hearing
implicates due process concerns of fundamental fairness.68
The assumption that institutionalization ought to inevitably lead to a competency
challenge is seriously flawed and is demonstrated by relevant scientific research.69
Nevertheless, it is clear that many courts will continue to follow this doctrine, sub
silentio, especially in criminal cases.70

B. Trivialization of the Client’s Complaints
Clients often have complaints. They may complain about the way a case is
progressing, the impact the litigation is having on their lives, or a plethora of
other matters, many of which are only tangentially connected to the lawyer-client

See Robert Panzarella & Justin O. Alecia, Police Tactics in Incidents with Mentally Disturbed
Persons, 20 Policing: Int’l J. Police Strategies & Mgmt. 326 (1997).
63

64

Id. at 335.

65

Id. at 336.

We discuss these issues and the significance of the Panzarella and Alecia article in Michael
L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, “Had to Be Held Down by Big Police”: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence
Perspective on Interactions Between Police and Persons with Mental Disabilities, Fordham Urb.
L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 22) (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2676909) [hereinafter Big Police]; see also Panzarella & Alecia, supra note 63.
66

67

See Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1987).

68

Id. at 1522–23 (citations omitted).

69

See, e.g., Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 56.

On the significance of Sinclair in this context, see Michael L. Perlin, Beyond Dusky and
Godinez: Competency Before and After Trial, 21 Behav. Sci. & L. 297, 303–05 (2003).
70
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relationship. Oftentimes, they may also have complaints about the conditions
of their confinement in hospitals, the deprivation of their civil rights, and the
dehumanizing reality of being institutionalized.71
If a presumably-mentally competent client complains to a lawyer, we can
expect (or at least hope) that the lawyer will take the complaint relatively seriously,
if for no other reason than that the failure to do so may trigger a disciplinary
investigation. But if the client has a mental disability, or is perceived as having a
mental disability, such complaints are often trivialized, ignored, or mocked.
How do we know this? Scholarly research supports the notion that individ
uals with mental illness do not receive equal representation due to sanism on the
part of their attorneys and judges overseeing the case. A critical component of
the lawyer-client relationship is ensuring that client input into the representation
is integrated into the attorney’s case strategy. In cases involving individuals with
mental disabilities, sanism frequently prevents attorneys from giving client input
the same weight, giving those clients less control in how their case proceeds.72
Not only is this phenomenon documented in sanism research, but we have
also experienced it firsthand in our own practices. For the forty-plus years that
MLP has been a member of the bar, devoting his practice and consultation almost
exclusively to issues of mental disability law, he has witnessed such behavior
and heard such comments by countless lawyers, many of whom (e.g., criminal
defense lawyers and civil legal aid lawyers) should know better. In addition, in
her two plus years as a practicing lawyer, AJL has had sadly identical experiences.
She has found that clients with mental disabilities often have to work harder for
equal, effective, and adequate representation. This is not primarily because they
present such radically difficult or different legal issues for attorneys; rather, it is
because, first and foremost, they must convince an attorney that they are
somehow worthy of equal advocacy.73 Clients with mental disabilities are seen as
an annoyance, and their problems are viewed as simply not as important.74

71

See Sanism in Clinical Teaching, supra note 42, at 697.

See generally Perlin & Sadoff, supra note 17; Perlin & Cucolo, supra note 16, §§ 6-6-6.4,
6-68–6-96; see also, e.g., Andalman & Chambers, supra note 17; State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy,
No. 441-417 (Cir. Ct., Milwaukee Cty., Wis., Aug. 18, 1976); Leslie Scallet, The Realities of
Mental Health Advocacy: State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, in Mental Health Advocacy: An
Emerging Force in Consumers’ Rights 79, 81 (Louis E. Kopolow & Helene Bloom eds., 1977);
Cohen, supra note 21, at 448; Henry Weihofen, Mental Health Services for the Poor, 54 Cal. L. Rev.
920, 939 (1966). For a brilliant journalistic recounting, see Susan Sheehan, Is There No Place on
Earth For Me? (2d ed. 1983).
72

73
See Stanley S. Herr, Representation of Clients with Disabilities: Issues of Ethics and Control, 17
N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 609 (1989).

The parallels here to the way hospital staff refer to patients who seek to assert their rights as
“pesky,” see Sheehan, supra note 72.
74
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Therefore, persuasion in these cases is not just the job of the attorney. It is
first the job of the client who must convince the attorney to take on the case,
to believe his or her retelling of the facts, and to be viewed as warranting the
same level of representation as a client without a mental disability.75 This need
for persuasion is tied to sanism on the part of the attorney. Not just laypersons,
but also attorneys, judges, and treatment professionals see clients with mental
disabilities as more persuasive when they have fewer obvious symptoms—and
fewer visual symptoms—of mental illness.76
Sanism overshadows persuasion in many ways, and attorneys need to be
prepared, just as the clients are, to fight not only bias due to being a criminal
defendant or a person subject to involuntary civil commitment or to guardian-ship,
but also bias in the form of being seen as disabled or disempowered.77 Those types
of judgments made by jurors require even greater skill on the part of the attorney
to overcome. In fact, in most cases involving clients with mental disabilities,
attorneys need to be even more skilled in persuasive argument technique because
there is often so much bias directed at their clients—biases that are rarely, if ever,
questioned.78
This is particularly apparent when a client chooses to speak for himself or
herself in the context of formal testimony to a court or even in a less formal
setting where he or she is expressing an opinion about an issue related to his
or her treatment or legal outcome.79 The sanist and paternalistic attitudes of
opposing counsel, judges, jury members, doctors, and administrators can almost
be palpable. A shift occurs in the room, signifying that what the individual has
to say is less important due to his or her status as a mentally disabled person,
immediately putting him or her at a disadvantage. This shift is why, more than
ever, attorneys representing this population need not only effective advocacy
skills training, but also training in the realm of TJ to directly rid them of conscious
or unconscious sanist biases. If a client is rarely seen as persuasive and compelling
75

See Sheehan, supra note 72.

See Michael L. Perlin, The Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling
Role of “Mitigating” Mental Disability Evidence, 8 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 239,
246 (1994) (“Fact-finders demand that defendants conform to popular, common-sensical visual
images of ‘looking crazy.’”). See, generally Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism
Mythology of Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 599, 724–27 (1989-1990). On
how we use such false OCS to “generalize and wrongly stereotype persons with mental disorder in
order to justify prejudiced decision making against them,” see Grant H. Morris, The Evil That Men
Do: Perverting Justice to Punish Perverts, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1199, 1201 n.13 (2000).
76

77
See Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and
Biased Prototypes, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 747 (2001).
78
See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in
Mental Disability Cases, 16 Law & Hum. Behav. 39, 39 (1992).

See James A. Holstein, Mental Illness Assumptions in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 16
J. Contemp. Ethnography 147 (1987).
79
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on his own, the attorney must be prepared to pick-up the slack and overcompen
sate due to the sanism that is present in many hospitals80 and courtrooms.81

C. Effects on the Lawyer-Client Relationship
If lawyers do not take their clients or their clients’ legal problems seriously,
lawyers may not forge the sort of lawyer-client relationship that is the aspirational
goal of the practice of law.82 Certainly, doubting your client’s competence (and/
or veracity) and trivializing your client’s complaints will not advance building
such a relationship. Because persons with mental disabilities are trivialized and
the essence of their basic humanity is often questioned, adverse case outcomes are
simply not taken as seriously.83
MLP has previously written about the importance of judicial recognition of
the humanity of this population:
Nearly thirty years ago, when I was the director of the New
Jersey Division of Mental Health Advocacy, I litigated a
case that changed my life. That case—Falter v. Veterans
Administration 84—was about the way veterans with mental
illness (at that time, especially Vietnam veterans) were treated at
the Veterans Administration (“VA”) Medical Center in Lyons,
New Jersey. Following the litigation in the Falter case, the VA
promulgated the first Patients’ Bill of Rights on behalf of persons

On sanism in hospitals, see Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine, and Trust, 55 Stan. L. Rev.
463 (2002).
80

On sanism in courtrooms, see Michael L. Perlin, “Things Have Changed”: Looking at NonInstitutional Mental Disability Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 535, 542
(2002-2003).
81

See, e.g., Robert MacCrate, Educating a Changing Profession: From Clinic to Continuum, 64
Tenn. L. Rev. 1099, 1130 (1997).
82

Perhaps the first case to take this issue seriously was Lessard v. Schmidt. See Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1101– 02 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414 U.S. 473 (1974) (stating the
“conclusion [that due process is mandated at involuntary civil commitment hearings] is fortified by
medical evidence that indicates that patients respond more favorably to treatment when they feel
they are being treated fairly and are treated as intelligent, aware, human beings.” Some years ago,
one of the co-authors wrote that this passage “seems to qualify as one of the true judicial forerunners
of therapeutic jurisprudence.” Michael L. Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights
of Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption?, 1 Psychol.
Pub. Pol’y & L. 80, 90 (1995)).
83

Michael L. Perlin & John Douard, “Equality, I Spoke that Word As If a Wedding Vow”:
Mental Disability Law and How We Treat Marginalized Persons, 53 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 9, 10 (20082009); see Falter v. Veterans Admin., 502 F. Supp. 1178 (D.N.J. 1980).
84
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in its facilities,85 and attention was paid to substantive areas of
patients’ rights that all too often were previously ignored . . . .86
But what has lasted with me most vividly from Falter was one
line of Judge Harold Ackerman’s initial decision: “[In this
opinion], I am referring to how [plaintiffs] are treated as human
beings.”87 I read that line in the slip opinion, and for a moment,
my breath stopped. Prior to that time, I had been representing
persons with mental disabilities for nearly a decade, and litigated other class actions that truly had a vast impact on the
New Jersey mental health system. But never before had a judge
written a line like this in an opinion in one of my cases.88
In problematic lawyer-client relationships of the sort we are discussing here,
lawyers will be prone to dismiss or ignore the client’s view about the course of
litigation. For example, the selection of a theory of the case, pre-trial discovery,
case strategizing, choice of witnesses, structuring of cross-examination, and choice
of remedy may all be adversely affected. Such suggestions are rarely taken seriously.
Another voice that is typically ignored is that of “psychiatric survivor
groups.”89 For at least thirty-five years, formerly hospitalized individuals and their
supporters have formed an important role in the reform of the mental health
system and in test case litigation.90 Yet, there is little evidence that these groups
are taken seriously either by lawyers or academics.91
85
Perlin & Douard, supra note 84; see Falter v. Veterans Admin., 632 F. Supp. 196, 203
(D.N.J. 1986) (stating that “[i]n December 1982, the V.A. Patients’ Bill of Rights was promulgated.”).
86
Perlin & Douard, supra note 84; see id. at 203–08 (noting the patients’ rights such as
rights to privacy while using telephones, to privacy in reading mail, to visitation, and to attend
religious services).
87

Perlin & Douard, supra note 84; see Falter, 502 F. Supp. at 1185.

88

Perlin & Douard, supra note 84.

Peter Margulies, The Cognitive Politics of Professional Conflict: Law Reform, Mental
Health Treatment Technology, and Citizen Self-Governance, 5 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 25, 49 n.102
(1992); see Jennifer Honig & Susan Fendell, Meeting the Needs of Female Trauma Survivors: The
Effectiveness of the Massachusetts Mental Health Managed Care System, 15 Berkeley Women’s L.J.
161, 185 (2000).
89

90
Survivor groups generally have opposed the constitutionality or application of involuntary civil commitment statutes, see Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983), or
supported the right of patients to refuse the involuntary administration of psychotropic drugs,
see Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 838 (3d. Cir. 1981), but also have involved themselves in a far
broader range of litigation. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (discussing the
impact of severe mental disability on the Miranda waiver. The Committee on the Fundamental
Rights and Equality of Ex-Patients [FREE] filed amicus brief on behalf of respondent.).

See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, An Internet-Based Mental Disability Law Program: Implications
for Social Change in Nations with Developing Economies, 30 Fordham Int’l L.J. 435, 444 n.39
(2007). There are, of course, important exceptions. See, e.g., Shin Imai, A Counter-Pedagogy for
91
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At its base, sanism is irrational.92 Any investigation of the roots or sources of
mental disability jurisprudence must factor in society’s irrational mechanisms for
dealing with mentally disabled individuals. The entire legal system and virtually
all of society93 makes assumptions about persons with mental disabilities—who
they are, how they got that way, what makes them different, what there is about
them that allows us to treat them differently, and whether their conditions are
immutable. These assumptions reflect our fears and apprehensions about mental
disability, persons with mental disability, and the possibility that we ourselves may
become mentally disabled.94 The most important question of all—why do we feel
the way we do about these people?—is rarely asked.95

D. Likely Outcomes
Sanist lawyers who distrust their clients are inevitably going to be less persua
sive than lawyers who trust their clients and who authentically represent their
views.96 As a result, negative case outcomes will be taken less seriously. This should
be clear to all, but probably requires us to concede that this is utterly “under the
radar” for most lawyers. This summer, MLP had the opportunity to observe three
problem-solving courts in New Zealand: a youth court, a homelessness court,

Social Justice: Core Skills for Community-Based Lawyering, 9 Clinical L. Rev. 195, 199 (2002)
(discussing Osgoode Hall Law School’s clinic’s collaborative work with Parkdale Community Legal
Services in representing one such group); Tewksbury v. Dowling, 169 F. Supp. 2d 103 (E.D.N.Y.
2001); Charles W. v. Maul, 214 F.3d 350 (2d Cir. 2000).
See Pamela R. Champine, A Sanist Will?, 46 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 547, 548 (2002-2003);
Michael L. Perlin, “Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain”: Considering the Sexual
Autonomy Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of Mental Disability in Forensic Hospitals and
in Asia, 83 Wash. L. Rev. 481, 481–82 (2008) [hereinafter Sexual Autonomy]; John W. Parry,
The Death Penalty and Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Lethal Dose of Stigma, Sanism, Fear of
Violence, and Faulty Predictions of Dangerousness, 29 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 667
(2005); Jennifer M. Poole et al., Sanism, Mental Health, and Social Work/Education: A Review and
Call to Action, 1 Intersectionalities: Global J. Soc. Work Analysis, Res., Polity, & Prac. 20
(2012); Lynn C. Holley et al., Reconceptualizing Stigma: Toward a Critical Anti-Oppression Paradigm,
2 Stigma Res. & Action 51 (2012); Alexandra Bacopoulos-Viau & Aude Fauvel, The Patient’s Turn:
Roy Porter and Psychiatry’s Tales, Thirty Years On, 60 Med. Hist. 1 (2016).
92

93

See generally The Hidden Prejudice, supra note 44.

See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Competency, Deinstitutionalization, and Homelessness: A Story
of Marginalization, 28 Hous. L. Rev. 63, 93 n.174 (1991) (stating that “while race and sex are
immutable, we all can become mentally ill, homeless, or both. Perhaps this illuminates the level of
virulence we experience here.”).
94

95
See Michael L. Perlin, The Jurisprudence of the Insanity Defense 6–7 (1994) (asking
this question).
96
See Sanism in Clinical Teaching, supra note 42, at 695–97. MLP had occasion to speak to
private counsel who had been assigned to represent a patient in a county in which the New Jersey
Division of Mental Health Advocacy (which the co-author then directed) did not represent patients.
The assigned counsel asked MLP, “Why is the State wasting money to pay me to do this bullshit?”
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and a drug court. In blogging about these visits, he concluded glowingly, “Simply
put, I have never, in such a short period of time, had the honor to observe such
examples of therapeutic jurisprudence in action,”97 adding that,
In my entire career as a lawyer—spanning over [forty] years,
practicing in NJ and NY—I have only seen a handful of judges
that ran their courtroom with the level of dignity that I observed
and that showed the defendants and all others who came before
them the level of respect that I saw here.98
But this blog post omitted one vivid negative experience. Virtually all of the
representation was provided by local public defenders, legal aid lawyers, or “duty
lawyers” (a group regularly assigned to represent defendants in court). One
lawyer was clearly there involuntarily, having been appointed to represent one
of the defendants who had been charged with drug offenses in the homelessness
court. He barely spoke to his client, his disdain was apparent, and at the bail
hearing, he said, “Your honor, my client is very volatile.” At first blush, this was
dumbfounding, but on the briefest consideration, it was utterly reflective of the
behavior of lawyers who do not care about the potential for negative outcomes
for their clients. Ironically, the presiding judge subsequently emailed the author,
relating that he bailed the defendant out in two days when a “safe house” became
available. The judge stated, “[s]he is there at the moment and getting good support
from her social worker.”99 The defendant’s lawyer would not have shown this level
of concern for his client.
Generally, laypeople are shocked when we tell them that an institutionalized
individual has just as much a right as any other person to representation in
commitment proceedings, and is able to actually have a similar amount of
control over the way his or her case is presented by the attorney.100 Attorneys
are also generally surprised that we allow our clients to voice their opinions to us,
and under appropriate circumstances to the judge, and use those opinions as the
basis for their cases.
Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Action, Therapeutic Jurisprudence in the
Mainstream Blog (Sept. 5, 2015), https://perma.cc/9H6Y-NMEX.
97

98

Id.

E-mail from Judge Anthony Fitzgerald to Michael L. Perlin (Sept. 14, 2015) (on file
with author).
99

100
Laypeople are also shocked when they find out that, in the context of our representation,
we advocate for the sexual autonomy of our clients. When one of the co-authors (MLP) spoke
about this topic to a public audience at the Florida Mental Health Institute (part of the University
of South Florida in Tampa) some years ago, an audience member (from the general public) leapt
to his feet, and denounced him: “Professor Perlin, you are an agent of the devil!” At a New York
City hospital presentation, a nurse folded her arms across her chest, and announced, “Professor, you
are the very embodiment of evil!” A nurse at a New Jersey state hospital told him, “God explicitly
forbids what you are talking about,” the nurse adding that she “would pray for [Michael’s] soul.”
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Persuasion, in all its forms, is important here as well. As seen in the context of
criminal law, there are multiple levels of bias and sanism that attorneys encounter
in this particular form of advocacy. Additionally, the reactions given when this
topic is discussed make it clear that persuasiveness will not only come from helping
others understand the individual circumstances of clients, but from seeing and
understanding the larger issues involved in this particular topic.
Some seven years ago, MLP stated: “Over the past fifteen years, I have
frequently spoken about issues related to psychiatric patient sexuality. I have
grown accustomed to the ‘There he goes again!’ eye-rolling I get from colleagues
when I tell them that I write and think about the issues related to institutionalized
patients having sex.”101 During several talks on this topic, MLP has noted how
faculty colleagues reacted when he embarked on this line of advocacy and
scholarship, and its connection to sanism:
I was sitting at my faculty lunch table, and conversation turned
to upcoming presentations that we would soon be doing. My
colleagues mostly take left-liberal positions on a wide variety
of issues, and are generically the exact mix of retro ‘60s
generationists and early baby boomers that you’d expect. They
(appropriately) are quick to criticize any behavior that is racist,
sexist, ethnically bigoted or homophobic. Rush Limbaugh
would probably view them as one of his worst “politically cor
rect” horror fantasies. I’m not terribly out of place in this group.
[W]hen it got to be my turn, I said that I was going to be
speaking about the right of institutionalized mentally disabled
persons to sexual interaction. All conversation came to a
screeching halt. “Michael, are you serious?” “Are you crazy
(sic)?” “Michael, even for you, you’ve gone too far!” “What are
you going to say next: that they can get married?!?” Et cetera.102
Keep these attitudes in mind—especially in the context of the politics of those
who were expressing them—as we turn to therapeutic jurisprudence.

101

Sexual Autonomy, supra note 92, at 483.

102

Sanism in Clinical Teaching, supra note 42, at 703.
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IV. Therapeutic Jurisprudence (TJ)103
TJ “asks us to look at law as it actually impacts people’s lives”104 and focuses
on the law’s influence on emotional life and psychological well-being.105 The
ultimate aim of TJ is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer
roles can or should be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while
not subordinating due process principles.106 There is an inherent tension in this
inquiry, but Professor David Wexler clearly identifies how it must be resolved:
The law’s use of “mental health information to improve therapeutic functioning
[cannot] impinge upon justice concerns.”107 Again, it is vital to keep in mind that
“[a]n inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns
‘trump’ civil rights and civil liberties.”108
In its aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance rights, and promote
well-being, TJ has been described as “a sea-change in ethical thinking about the
role of law[;] . . . a movement towards a more distinctly relational approach to
the practice of law . . . which emphasises psychological wellness over adversarial
triumphalism.”109 That is, TJ supports an ethic of care.110

103

See generally Big Police, supra note 66.

Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on Dealing with Victims of
Crime, 33 Nova L. Rev. 535, 535 (2009).
104

See David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psycholegal Soft Spots and
Strategies, in Daniel P. Stolle et al., Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Law as a Helping
Profession 45 (2000).
105

See Michael L. Perlin, “And My Best Friend, My Doctor/Won’t Even Say What It Is I’ve
Got”: The Rold and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 San Diego L.
Rev. 735, 751 (2005); Sexual Autonomy, supra note 92, at 510 n.139; see also Bernard P. Perlmutter,
George’s Story: Voice and Transformation Through the Teaching and Practice of Therapeutic Juris
prudence in a Law School Child Advocacy Clinic, 17 St. Thomas L. Rev. 561, 599 n.111 (2005);
Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and Risk of
Influence, 30 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 575, 585–86 (2008).
106

107
David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Concepts of Legal Scholarship,
11 Behav. Sci. & L. 17, 21 (1993); see also David B. Wexler, Applying the Law Therapeutically, 5
Applied & Preventive Psychol. 179 (1996).
108
A Law of Healing, supra note 24, at 412. See also Michael L. Perlin, “Where the Winds Hit
Heavy on the Borderline”: Mental Disability Law, Theory and Practice, Us and Them, 31 Loy. L. Rev.
775, 782 (1998).

Warren Brookbanks, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework, 8 J.L. &
Med. 328, 329 –30 (2001); see also Bruce J. Winick, Overcoming Psychological Barriers to Settlement:
Challenges for the TJ Lawyer, in Marjorie A. Silver, The Affective Assistance of Counsel:
Practicing Law as a Healing Profession 341 (2006); Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The
Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School Clinical Education: Transforming the Criminal Law
Clinic, 13 Clinical L. Rev. 605, 605–06 (2006). The use of the phrase dates back to 1982, see
Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (1982).
109

See, e.g., Winick & Wexler, supra note 109, at 605– 07; David B. Wexler, Not Such a
Party Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of ) Professor Quinn’s Concerns about Therapeutic
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We cannot lose sight of the fact that there is often an inherent bias against
litigants with mental disabilities, and the greater the bias, the more essential it is
for lawyers to rely on TJ in representation. MLP recently wrote an article with
a colleague about representing the most hated of all clients (those alleged to be
sexually violent predators) and made the following comment about TJ:
Those very variables that make SVPA [sexually violent predator
act] litigation different—the need for lawyers to be able to
understand, contextualize and effectively cross-examine experts
on specific actuarial tests; the need for lawyers to recognize
when an expert witness is needed to rebut the state’s position,
and the need for lawyers to understand the potential extent of
jury bias (making the ideal of a fair trial even more difficult to
accomplish)—all demand a TJ approach to representation and
to litigation.111
In another piece, he explored the TJ-based conversations a lawyer should
have with other disfavored clients (those who raise the incompetency status or
who plead insanity).112 Some of the potential TJ-based conversations include:


If a defendant is, in fact, incompetent to stand trial, that
means that he does not have a sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding and or a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him; how can TJ
principles be invoked in such a case?



If a defendant is initially found to be incompetent to stand
trial, will the lawyer act as most lawyers and consider him
to be de facto incompetent for the entire proceeding (as a

Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 597, 599 (2007); Warren Brookbanks,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an Ethical Framework, 8 J.L. & Med. 328, 329–30 (2001);
Gregory Baker, Do You Hear the Knocking at the Door? A “Therapeutic” Approach to Enriching Clinical
Legal Education Comes Calling, 28 Whittier L. Rev. 379, 385 (2006).
111
Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, “Far from the Turbulent Space”: Considering the
Adequacy of Counsel in the Representation of Individuals Accused of Being Sexually Violent Predators, 18
U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change 125, 166–67 (2015).
112
See Michael L. Perlin, “Too Stubborn to Ever Be Governed By Enforced Insanity”: Some
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Dilemmas in the Representation of Criminal Defendants in Incompetency
and Insanity Cases, 33 Int’l J.L. & Psychiatry 475, 480 n.63 (2010) [hereinafter Too Stubborn].
See also Michael L. Perlin, “God Said to Abraham/Kill Me a Son”: Why the Insanity Defense and the
Incompetency Status Are Compatible with and Required by the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities and Basic Principles of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Am. Crim. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2016) (manuscript at 64–66) (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2683480). On
TJ-based conversations that a lawyer should have with such a client prior to criminal sentencing,
see Michael L. Perlin, “I Expected It to Happen/I Knew He’d Lost Control”: The Impact of PTSD on
Criminal Sentencing After the Promulgation of DSM-5, 4 Utah L. Rev. 881, 924–25 (2015).
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significant percentage of lawyers do act for any client who
is institutionalized)?


If a defendant is found to be incompetent to stand trial, will
the lawyer assume that he is also guilty of the underlying
criminal charge?



What are the issues that a lawyer must consider in addition
to the client’s mental state in assessing whether or not to
invoke an incompetency determination?



What are the TJ implications for a case in which the
incompetency status is not raised by the defendant, but,
rather, by the prosecutor or the judge?



Are there times when TJ principles might mandate not
raising the incompetency status (for example, in a case in
which the maximum sentence to which the defendant is
exposed is six months in a county workhouse but is in a
jurisdiction in which IST defendants are regularly housed in
maximum security forensic facilities for far longer periods of
time than the maximum to which they could be sentenced)?



What are the TJ implications of counseling a defendant to
plead or not to plead the insanity defense?



Can a defendant who pleads NGRI ever, truly,
take responsibility?



Does the fact that the insanity-pleading defendant must
concede that he committed the actus reus distort the
ongoing lawyer-client relationship?



To what extent do the ample bodies of case law construing
the ineffectiveness assistance of counsel standard established
by the US Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington 113
even consider the implications of TJ lawyering?



To what extent does the pervasiveness of sanism make
it obligatory for lawyers in such cases to educate jurors
about both sanism and why sanism may be driving

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (stating, “whether counsel’s
conduct so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that the trial court cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result.”).
113
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their decisionmaking, and to what extent should lawyers
in such cases embark on this educational process using
TJ principles?114
One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to dignity.115 Professor Amy Ronner describes voice, validation, and voluntariness as the “three Vs”
and116 argues:
What “the three Vs” commend is pretty basic: litigants must
have a sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision
maker. If that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely
listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant’s story, the
litigant feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge from
a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and validation, they are
more at peace with the outcome. Voice and validation create
a sense of voluntary participation, one in which the litigant
experiences the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the
feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily partook in the
very process that engendered the end result or the very judicial
pronunciation that affects their own lives can initiate healing
and bring about improved behavior in the future. In general,
human beings prosper when they feel that they are making, or at
least participating in, their own decisions.117
The question to be considered is this: To what extent can TJ be employed with the
psychology of persuasion so as to eradicate sanism in the representation of persons
with mental disabilities?

V. The Psychology of Persuasion
In the call for papers emerging from the University of Wyoming College
of Law Symposium on the Psychology of Persuasion, the organizers laid down
their charge:
Good advocates need to understand basic principles of cognitive
psychology in order to craft the most persuasive arguments they
can to support their client’s cause. Scholars who are currently
114

See Too Stubborn, supra note 112, at 477–78.

115

See Bruce J. Winick, Civil Commitment: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model 161 (2005).

Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and Therapeutic
Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 Touro L. Rev. 601, 627 (2008). On the
importance of “voice,” see Freckelton, supra note 106, at 588.
116

117
Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. Cin. L. Rev. 89, 94–95 (2002).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol16/iss2/3

22

Perlin and Lynch: “Mr. Bad Example”: Why Lawyers Need to Embrace Therapeutic Jurisp

2016

“Mr. Bad Example”

321

working in this area are invited to present their work and lead
discussions of how judges and juries process information and
reach decisions, and how lawyers can use that knowledge to
become more effective advocates.118
We agree 100% with the significance of this approach, and will use it as a
springboard for the topic that we have chosen to address: How lawyers can use TJ
as a means for eradicating sanism in their representation of persons with mental
disabilities. We focus here on the principle of validation, which we believe is of
critical importance from two perspectives. First, as we have already indicated,
validation is an integral part of TJ: “If that litigant feels that the tribunal has
genuinely listened to, heard, and taken seriously the litigant’s story, the litigant
feels a sense of validation.”119 This is one of the sine qua non of TJ and can never
be far from the mindset of the TJ inspired lawyer.
Over fifteen years ago, the late Professor Bruce Winick, along with Professor
David Wexler, a founder of TJ, stated: “Dealing with clients about such issues is
challenging work; it demands a high degree of psychological skill and judgment
and the ability to listen to the client, to make the client feel comfortable, to
communicate empathy, and to understand the social psychology of persuasion.”120
Remarkably, that is the only mention in the legal literature of the psychology of
persuasion in this context.
Beyond this, it is necessary to consider how validation is at the forefront of
the psychology of persuasion. Central to the psychology of persuasion is social
validation.121 Social validation means that we are significantly more likely to
take action when we see others, especially those who are similar to us take the
same action.122 We need to consider this in the context of the issues we raised
earlier about the conflicts lawyers often have in the representation of clients with
mental disabilities. If one juror makes a disparaging, sanist remark about such
an individual, how persuasive will that remark be to the other jurors? If one
lawyer in a law office makes such a remark (especially if it is a senior lawyer),
how persuasive will that be to the other lawyers? We must keep this phenomenon

118
Call for Proposals, University
D7LZ-F9GM.
119

of

Wyoming College

of

Law (2015), https://perma.cc/

Ronner, supra note 117, at 94.

Bruce J. Winick, Redefining the Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer at Plea Bargaining and
Sentencing a Therapeutic Jurisprudence/Preventative Law Model, 5 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y & L. 1034,
1064 (1999).
120

In Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: the Psychology of Persuasion (2006), Robert Cialdini
uses the phrase “social validation” as a principle that “governs what it is that we decide constitutes
correct behavior in a group setting.” Id. at 116.
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122
See Cordell M. Parvin, Unlocking the Secrets to Developing Your Future Rainmakers, 54 Prac.
L. 17, 22 (Oct. 2008), https://perma.cc/Y8A3-S42P.
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of social validation in our minds, and use it in different ways to best insure that
the legal process is authentically valid for the client base of which we speak.
This is why TJ is immensely beneficial and necessary, especially for education of
legal professionals.123
TJ allows for several end goals: it targets sanism, sets up a legal system where
the therapeutic benefit of legal solutions is not just discussed but actually made
to be a targeted outcome, and teaches attorneys and judges how to appropriately
interact with individuals with mental disabilities in all stages of the trial process.
By doing these things, TJ enhances the likelihood that counsel will provide
authentically effective representation for clients with mental disabilities.
Further, we believe it is profitable to turn our attention to the schools of
positive criminology and positive psychology, both of which are potentially
excellent sources for enhancing the psychology of persuasion. Professor David
B. Wexler has recently argued that TJ is “remarkably (but not at all surprisingly)
consistent with the school of ‘Positive Criminology,’ [which is] ‘oriented to
human strengths, resilience, and positive encounters that can assist individuals
in abstaining from crime and deviant behaviors.’”124 As Professor Wexler and
Tali Gal, an Israeli criminologist and lawyer, explained: Positive criminology
“goes against the focus of much of the research which highlights ‘goodness’ in
relation to normative people and ‘badness’ in relation to law-breakers, offering
an alternative research agenda that focuses on goodness in the lives of offenders,
victims, and those at risk of become either.”125 Similarly, “positive psychology
is ‘the scientific study of the strengths and virtues that enable individuals and
communities to thrive’—in short, the rigorous study of human flourishing.”126
It emphasizes positive experiences and traits, and studies how people flourish,
focusing on an individual’s well-being and the “good life.”127
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See Winick & Wexler, supra note 109.

David B. Wexler, Getting and Giving: What Therapeutic Jurisprudence Can Get from and
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VI. Conclusion
Lawyers should draw on the insights that TJ can provide in our efforts
to be psychologically persuasive in the hopes that the end result will be a new
paradigm for the representation of persons with mental disabilities. By validating
clients, giving them a voice, and insuring that their actions are authentically
voluntary, TJ can best strip the sanist façade from the representation of persons with
mental disabilities,128 and solve the “rolelessness” dilemma that bedevils practicing
lawyers in such circumstances. The shift to TJ will be psychologically persuasive.
It will allow lawyers to engage in meaningful collaborative conversations with
their clients and provide lawyers with skills and strategies through which they
can effectively rebut sanism in the courtroom. It will also offer a blueprint as to
how the attorney-client relationship can be restructured to enhance dignity and
respect, and in the words of Judge Ackerman in the Falter case, take seriously how
we treat the population as “human beings.”129
In “Mr. Bad Example,” Warren Zevon also sings, “I don’t care who gets
hurt.”130 The willful blindness exhibited by most lawyers in the representation
of the population that we are discussing here is the functional equivalent of the
lawyer not caring “who gets hurt.” We hope that the ideas we discussed in this
article will lead more lawyers to realize exactly who is hurt when they allow sanism
to infect their representation. If this happens, we will have accomplished what we
have set out to do.
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